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This paper investigates whether responses to choice experiments (CEs) are subject to 
sequencing anomalies. While previous research has focussed on the possibility that such 
anomalies relate to position in the sequence of choice tasks, our research reveals that the 
particular sequence of tasks matters. Using a novel experimental design that allows us to test 
our hypotheses using robust nonparametric statistics, we observe sequencing anomalies in CE 
data similar to those recorded in the dichotomous choice contingent valuation literature. 
Those sequencing effects operate in both price and commodity dimensions and are observed 
to compound over a series of choice tasks. Our findings cast serious doubt on the current 
practice of asking each respondent to undertake several choice tasks in a CE whilst treating 
each response as an independent observation on that individual’s preferences. 
 
Keywords: Choice experiments; sequencing anomalies; ordering effects; dichotomous choice 
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Over recent years, techniques of choice modelling such as choice experiments (CEs) 
have enjoyed a startling rise in popularity amongst the practitioners of non-market valuation 
(Adamowicz, 2004). The fundamental building block of a CE is a choice task. A choice task 
confronts subjects with two or more options where the options differ both in the qualities of 
the non-market good (the “commodity dimension”) and in the cost imposed on the subject 
(the “price dimension”). The usual procedure is to ask subjects to indicate their preferred 
option in a series of such choice tasks. As such, CEs provide a rich data source from which 
researchers can deduce how subjects are prepared to trade off between money and the various 
dimensions of the commodity space. 
In contrast, dichotomous-choice (DC) contingent valuation techniques, that had 
previously enjoyed the status of “most preferred valuation method”, provide a relative 
paucity of data. In their earliest inception (Bishop and Heberlein, 1979), DC contingent 
valuation exercises presented each respondent with just one task; a choice between the status 
quo and the provision of the non-market good at a cost. Across a sample of respondents, the 
commodity dimensions were held constant whilst the price dimension was varied so that the 
willingness to pay distribution for that particular manifestation of the non-market good could 
be estimated. Whilst this ‘single-bounded’ DC (SBDC) elicitation method was strongly 
endorsed by the US National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration’s blue ribbon 
panel (Arrow et al., 1993), practitioners were concerned by its relative inefficiency. In 
particular, the data from a SBDC cannot provide values for other manifestations of the non-
market good. Moreover, since each respondent provides just one piece of information large 
samples sizes are required. 
In response to the latter criticism, Hanemann, Loomis and Kanninen (1991) proposed 
the ‘double-bounded’ DC (DBDC) elicitation method. Here, following the initial DC 
question, a ‘follow-up’ DC question is asked offering the non-market good at a different 








Subsequent empirical testing, however, has revealed a robust anomaly in responses to 
DBDC questions. In particular, numerous studies have observed that the preferences implied 
by responses to first questions differ systematically from those implied by responses to 
follow-up questions (e.g. McFadden, 1994; Herriges and Shogren, 1996). Interestingly, the 
particular order of prices appears to be important; sequences of questions in which the price 
rises from the first question to the second have a much more profound impact on preferences 
than those that fall (De Shazo, 2002). The existence of these price-sequencing effects casts 
serious doubt on the validity of responses to follow-up questions. Indeed, one might argue 
that these well-documented problems have precipitated a growing disaffection with DC 
contingent valuation and contributed to the growing interest in CE methods.  
While there are a number of differences between DC contingent valuation and CE 
approaches, there are also many similarities. For example, whilst differing in presentation, the 
SBDC elicitation method is essentially a simple form of CE in which subjects face only one 
choice task requiring a preference to be stated between the status quo and an alternative in 
which a non-market good is provided at a price. Likewise, the DBDC elicitation method is a 
CE with two choice tasks pitting the status quo against an alternative offering a non-market 
good. In this case, moving from the first choice task to the second, the price dimension of the 
alternative is altered, but there is no change in the commodity dimension.  
Given these similarities a fundamental question that must be asked of the CE method 
is whether it is subject to the same price-sequencing anomalies as have been observed in 
DBDC contingent valuation studies. This paper sets out to address that question. In addition, 
since CEs allow commodity as well as price dimensions to vary across tasks, this study seeks 
to establish if equivalent commodity-sequencing anomalies are observable in CE responses. 
Indeed, our study is designed to examine how preferences are impacted in cases characterised 
by simultaneous price- and commodity-sequences. Finally, since CEs typically present a 
series of choice tasks, a further objective is to explore how sequencing anomalies develop 








While a number of previous studies have investigated the issue of sequencing 
anomalies in CEs, most have sought to identify patterns of changes in stated preferences that 
relate simply to position in the sequence of tasks. In the main, this literature has been based 
on parametric modelling of preferences in the random utility framework. For example, 
Bateman et al. (2008) allow the coefficient of the preference function relating to the money 
attribute to vary according to task order and find that respondents’ express a gradually higher 
marginal utility of income as they progress through the sequence of choice tasks. In a similar 
vein, a number of studies have parameterised the scale of the random element of the 
preference function so as to examine trends related to position in the question sequence (e.g. 
Adamowicz et al., 1998, Caussade et al., 2005). Evidence of increasingly variable preferences 
are usually interpreted as indicating respondent fatigue (e.g. Phillips, Johnson, and Maddala, 
2002) while decreasing variability is usually interpreted as preference learning (e.g. Bateman 
et al., 2008, Holmes and Boyle, 2005). 
In contrast, our work draws on the insights provided by the extensive literature on 
sequencing effects in DC contingent valuation. Rather than assuming that sequencing effects 
relate simply to position in the sequence, our work seeks to understand how sequencing 
effects are determined by the particular order in which the choice tasks are presented. As we 
shall see, we find that expressed preferences are profoundly affected by the particular 
sequence of tasks.  
Within the context of CEs the study that is most similar to our work is that of Holmes 
and Boyle (2005). They test to see whether responses to CE tasks are influenced by the nature 
of the preceding and following choice tasks. They estimate a parametric model of preferences 
that includes terms reflecting the values of price and commodity attributes of options in those 
previous and future choice tasks. They find a number of these lagged terms to be significant 
determinants of preferences.  
The study presented in this paper explores sequencing effects in a radically different 








receiving a sequence of three choice tasks. The order of choice tasks differs across samples 
allowing us to examine a variety of hypotheses regarding the nature of sequencing effects. 
The design is such that each hypothesis can be tested through a simple across-sample 
comparison of responses to a particular choice task using robust non-parametric statistics. In 
contrast to previous studies, we are able to examine sequencing effects in CEs without 
imposing assumptions regarding the structure of preferences. Our nonparametric approach is 
both simple and transparent and as such, we believe, increases the credibility of our findings.  
In the next section we describe the sorts of sequencing anomalies previously observed 
in contingent valuation exercises and consider how these might translate to CE-style 
questions. Section 3 describes the experiment we have designed to test those hypotheses. 
Section 4 presents the results of our empirical research and Section 5 provides a summary 
and some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Sequencing Anomalies in Dichotomous Choice Contingent Valuation Studies  
The standard neoclassical economic model asserts axiomatically that individuals have 
complete and coherent preferences. In the context of a CE that assertion dictates that 
respondents can always determine which of any set of options in a choice task is their most 
preferred. Moreover, provided they are motivated to answer truthfully then their responses 
should not be affected by features of the elicitation procedure that are, according to the 
theory, decision-irrelevant. For example, according to this model of behaviour the preferred 
option in a particular choice task should not change according to the nature of the options 
presented in previous choice tasks. Responses that conform to this prediction are said to 
demonstrate procedural invariance. 
In the majority of applications of the CE methodology procedural invariance is 
assumed without testing. Violations of procedural invariance, however, present a profound 
problem for the elicitation of preferences using CEs. If, for example, expressed preferences 








it would be impossible to assert that preferences recovered from a particular sequence of 
tasks were somehow ‘true’ preferences. 
Of course, violations of procedural invariance are well-documented in the contingent 
valuation literature. In particular, several studies have reported price-sequencing anomalies in 
DBDC elicitation (e.g. McFadden, 1994; Cameron and Quiggen, 1994; Carson et al., 1994; 
Herriges and Shogren, 1996; Alberini, Kanninen and Carson, 1997; Bateman et al. 2001) 
possibly the most detailed of which being that of De Shazo (2002). De Shazo examined 
acceptance rates when a non-market good was offered at a particular price in the first 
question as compared to when it was offered at the same price in the follow-up question. In 
cases where those follow-up questions were preceded by a higher price (what we shall term 
an  improving  price sequence) there was no systematic difference in acceptance rates. 
However, when the preceding price was a lower amount (what we shall term a worsening 
price sequence) acceptance rates were significantly depressed.  
If price-sequencing affects acceptance rates in DBDC contingent valuation exercises, 
then an obvious question would be to ask if commodity-sequencing also precipitates 
violations of procedural invariance. Bateman and Brouwer (2006) in their investigation of 
scope insensitivity in DC contingent valuation studies provide some insight into the possible 
nature of commodity-sequencing anomalies. They confront respondents with two SBDC 
questions concerning a low and high level of provision of a non-market good. They compare 
the median value estimated from a sample responding to the low provision question first with 
those estimated from a sample responding to the high provision question first. They observe 
what they describe as “some fanning out of estimates as we move from first to second 
responses” (p.207). That is to say, the implied values of the large and small levels of 
provision are relatively more similar when calculated from the first question responses than 
when calculated from the follow-up responses. This observation is consistent with a 
commodity-sequencing anomaly in which a good is regarded more favourably when preceded 








sequence) whilst being regarded less favourably if preceded by a relatively larger level of 
provision (a worsening commodity sequence).  
  We summarise the evidence for sequencing effects from the DC contingent valuation 
literature in Table 1.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE] 
Now, consider a simple CE in which the respondent is faced by a series of tasks each 
requiring a choice to be made between just two options (which we label Option I and Option 
II). To simplify further, imagine that the commodity dimension of the good can be described 
as either small, medium or large. Likewise the prices can take the values €0, €Low and 
€High. In this context, we can construct pairs of choice tasks that exactly replicate contingent 
valuation questions with price- and commodity-sequences.  
For example, the sequence of choice tasks shown in the upper part of Figure 1 
replicates an improving price sequence in a DBDC contingent valuation question. Here 
Option I is the same in both tasks (the status quo in a DBDC contingent valuation question). 
Likewise, the commodity dimension of Option II is the same in both tasks (the new level of 
provision of the non-market good in a DBDC contingent valuation question). All that changes 
across the choice tasks is that the price dimension of Option II falls (an improving price 
sequence in a DBDC contingent valuation question). Accordingly, we describe Option II in 
Choice Task 2 as appearing in an improving price sequence. Notice that in the context of a 
CE the sequence is attributed to the particular Option in which it is observed.   
[INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE] 
The lower part of Figure 1 shows a sequence of CE questions that replicates the 
worsening price sequence of a DBDC contingent valuation question. Again Option I is the 
same in both tasks. Option II also offers the same level of provision but at a low price in the 
first choice task followed by a high price in the second choice task. Again we attribute the 
sequence to the option such that we describe Option II in Choice Task 2 as appearing in a 








If the series of choice tasks in Figure 1 exactly replicate improving and worsening 
price sequences in DBDC contingent valuation questions, then we might expect them to 
generate the same sequencing anomalies observed by De Shazo (2002). We could simply test 
that contention by presenting independent samples with the two sequences of choice tasks. 
Observe that the first choice task faced by one sample is identical to the second choice task 
faced by the other sample. Procedural invariance demands that the two samples will provide 
roughly similar responses to this task. In contrast, De Shazo’s results suggest that procedural 
invariance will only characterise the improving price sequence. The worsening price 
sequence, it is predicted, will induce a sequencing anomaly. In particular, the proportion 
favouring Option II when presented in the second choice task in a worsening price sequence 
will be significantly less than the proportion favouring that Option when presented in the first 
task to the other sample.  
Figure 2 presents a similar construction but this time illustrating Option I of the 
choice tasks following improving and worsening commodity sequences. In the upper 
diagram, for example, Option II does not change and in Option I the price is the same but the 
amount of good increases. This is then an improving commodity sequence in Option I. The 
opposite pattern, a worsening commodity sequence in Option I, is illustrated in the lower part 
of Figure 2.  
 [INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE] 
Again, the first choice task in the upper sequence is identical to the second choice task 
in the lower sequence. As such, a simple test for procedural invariance would be to present 
the two sequences of choice tasks to independent samples and compare response proportions 
for the matched tasks. If the observations of Bateman and Brouwer (2006) carry over to the 
CE framework, then we expect procedural invariance to be violated in both improving and 
worsening commodity sequences in the directions indicated in Table 1. 
Of course, in a CE it is unusual to have only one of the options changing from choice 








with options in mixed commodity and price sequences; that is to say, one option presents an 
improving (worsening) price sequence whilst the other an improving (worsening) commodity 
sequence. The possibility exists that sequencing anomalies might arise in this context also. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE] 
If the patterns of behaviour observed in DC contingent valuation studies carry over to 
these more complex choice situations, then the improving mixed sequence should result in 
violations of procedural invariance. In particular, in the improving sequence the relatively 
larger commodity offered by Option I in the second task leads respondents to regard this 
option more favourably, whilst the improved price offered by Option II in the second task 
results in no such equivalent bias. This combination of effects would lead to a relatively 
greater proportion of respondents favouring Option I in this choice task than would do if that 
same choice task was the first in the sequence.  
In the worsening mixed sequence, the two sequencing biases work in the same 
direction; the relatively smaller commodity offered by Option 1 makes this option appear less 
favourable but the relatively greater price offered by Option 2 makes this also appear less 
favourable. Since we are unable to determine in advance which of the two sequencing effects 
will dominate, it is not possible to make predictions concerning violations of procedural 
invariance in this case.  
  
3. Experimental Design and Testing Framework 
Our application concerns the valuation of health using a CE. In each choice task 
respondents were asked to imagine that they had been diagnosed with a medical problem that 
would result in a considerable deterioration in their quality of life. Quality of life was 
measured using the Euroqol (EQ-5D) (Brooks, 1996). EQ-5D is a standardised instrument for 
use as a measure of health outcome. It describes any health state through five dimensions; 
mobility, self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort, anxiety/depression. Each dimension can 








example, health state 11111 implies full health since it is equivalent to having no problems in 
each of the five dimensions. However, health state 33333 implies having extreme problems in 
each of the five dimensions. The advantage of using EQ-5D is that there are clear dominance 
relations between health states. In this study we used two EQ-5D health states, namely, 
21212 and 22223. Cleary, an improvement from 21212 to 11111 (full health) implied a 
smaller health gain than an improvement from 22223 to full health. A summary of the health 
state descriptions is provided in Figure 4. 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE] 
Respondents were informed that the problem was treatable and that following 
treatment they would be returned to full health within one year. In each choice task, subjects 
were asked to choose between two treatment options. One option was a medicine provided by 
the hospital. While this option was free of charge it meant that the subject would still 
experience quality of life-reducing symptoms for the first 2 months of treatment. The second 
option in each choice task was to purchase an alternative medicine from a pharmacy. While 
this treatment was costly, it meant that the subject would avoid any symptoms whilst being 
treated thereby enjoying a quality of life that was equivalent to full health.  
The commodity dimension of options in our CE described one of three states of 
health; two months of severe ill-health (health state 22223) or two months of mild ill-health 
(health state 21212) or on-going full health (health state 11111). In addition, the price 
dimension of options in our CE described one of four levels of treatment cost; €0, €60 
(€Low), €120 (€Med) or €240 (€High). As shown in Figure 5, a typical choice task pitted a 
zero cost treatment with 2 months of reduced quality of life, against a costly treatment that 
returned the subject to immediate full-health. 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 AROUND HERE] 
In order to simplify the presentation of our experimental design, it is expedient to 
further condense each choice task into the simple schematic shown on the right hand side of 








symptom’s duration dimensions have all been suppressed since these were always €0, 12 
months and 2 months respectively. Likewise the bottom box represents Option II with the 
commodity dimensions suppressed since these were always 12 months of treatment with no 
symptoms. 
For the purposes of our study, we constructed four different choice tasks. Our 
experimental design involved a six-way split sample with each sample facing a different set 
of three of those four choice tasks. We label the six samples, A1, A2, B1, B2, C1 and C2. The 
tasks and order in which they were presented to respondents in each sample are summarized 
using the simplifying schematic in Figure 6.  
[INSERT FIGURE 6 AROUND HERE] 
Procedural invariance requires that two independent samples presented with the same 
choice task will express approximately the same preferences irrespective of the details of any 
preceding choice tasks. The essence of our experimental design, therefore, is to confront 
independent samples with the same choice task but set in differing sequences and to record 
the proportions choosing each option. In this context, the null hypothesis can be tested using 
robust nonparametric tests to compare those proportions across the two samples.   
The first two tasks of our design are selected to test whether elicitation of preferences 
using CE-style questions precipitates the same sequencing anomalies observed in DC 
contingent valuation. For clarity, Table 2 describes the sequences for both options in these 
first two tasks and indicates the bias those sequences would precipitate should the sequencing 
effects observed in DC contingent valuation studies carry over to the CE context. Observe 
that the commodity on offer in our experiment is a bad. As such, an improving commodity 
sequence is one that moves from a worse health state (severe) to a better health state (mild). 
The comparison of response proportions for the first two choice tasks of samples A1 
and A2 provide tests of price-sequencing (as per Figure 1). The same comparison for samples 
B1 and B2 test for commodity-sequencing (as per Figure 2). While the comparison of samples 








[INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE] 
Through the inclusion of a third task, our design also allows us to consider how 
sequencing anomalies might evolve over a series of tasks. We return to discuss this issue in 
more detail in the next section. 
 
4. Results 
Each of the six samples was chosen so as to provide a representative sample of the 
population of Northern Spain that formed the location of interest for our investigations. 
Surveying was undertaken by professional interviewers in personal interview sessions. Each 
sample contained 83 observations except for sample B2 which contained 85. The data are 
summarised in Figure 6 which shows the proportions of each sample choosing each option in 
each choice task. For ease of exposition, we refer to the first question faced by sample A1 as 
A11, likewise the second question faced by this sample is A12, and so on. 
4.1 Tests of Consistency  
The fundamental contention of our experimental design is that each sample represents 
an independent observation of the same underlying population of preferences. Only if that is 
the case will it be sensible to draw inference from across-sample comparisons of responses. 
Moreover, we would hope that the preferences expressed by individuals in those samples 
conform to some basic tenets of economic theory. If this were not true, then we might 
conclude that responses to our choice tasks provide no meaningful information on economic 
behaviour. Our first set of tests are designed to confirm (or refute) these fundamental 
assertions.   
a.  Tests 1 to 3: Across-sample consistency in identical first choice task 
Each sample received identical information up to the point of the first choice task. 
Uniquely, therefore, responses to first choice tasks are unaffected by potential sequencing 
biases. We use that fact to test the contention that each sample is an independent observation 








Samples A1, B2 and C2 were presented with identical first choice tasks (tasks A11, B21, 
and C21 respectively). Our expectation is that the distribution of preferences in the three 
samples should be approximately the same. What we observe is that 25.3% of sample A1, 
25.9% of sample B2 and 28.9% of sample C2 chose Option I in the first task. As shown in 
Tests 1 to 3 of Table 3, a series of pairwise comparisons using a two-tailed chi-squared test of 
differences in proportions confirms that these differences are not statistically significant. 
Encouragingly, for these three samples at least, our choice tasks appear to be tapping 
into a distribution of preferences that does not differ systematically across samples. For the 
purposes of subsequent testing, we combine these three observations and treat them as 
observations pertaining to the same set of underlying preferences. Of that combined sample 
of 187 individuals, 25.5% chose Option I.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE] 
b.  Test 4: Across-sample consistency - more commodity at same price 
Standard economic theory indicates that individuals prefer more of good things to 
less. Accordingly, all else equal, we would expect more individuals to choose a treatment if it 
offered a greater health benefit.  
Samples A1, B2, C2 and sample B1 face a first choice task in which the treatment 
promising an immediate return to full health has the medium price. For samples A1, B2 and C2 
the alternative treatment entails suffering an episode of severe ill-health while for sample B1 
the alternative treatment involves an episode of only mild ill-health. In line with expectations, 
the proportion choosing this alternative jumps from 25.5% when the ill-health event is severe 
(A11, B21 and C21) up to 37.3% when the ill-health event is mild (B11). As shown in Test 4 of 
Table 3, a one-tailed test of differences in proportions confirms this to be a statistically 
significant difference (p-value: 0.0190).  
c.  Tests 5 & 6: Across-sample consistency - same commodity at different price 
In a similar vein, economic theory postulates that when making purchases people 








choose a treatment the higher its price. Again, that prediction is testable by comparing 
response proportions across samples. 
Samples  A1,  B2,  C2 and sample A2 face a first choice task in which the costless 
treatment involves enduring a severe ill-health event. For samples A1,  B2 and C2, the 
alternative treatment, promising an immediate return to full health, has the medium price 
while for sample A2 this treatment is offered at the high price. In line with expectations, the 
proportion choosing this alternative falls from 74.5% when offered at the medium price (A11, 
B21 and C21) to 67.5% when offered at the high price (A21). A similar comparison is possible 
between sample C1 and B1 both of whom face a first choice task in which the costless 
treatment results in a mild ill-health event. For sample C1 the alternative treatment can be 
obtained at the low price while for sample B1 that treatment is offered at the medium price. 
Again, we observe what we expect; 77.1% choose this alternative at the low price (C11) 
compared to 62.7% at the high price (B11). Referring to Tests 5 and 6 in Table 3, a one-tailed 
test reveals the first of these comparisons to be insignificant (p-value: 0.1061), while the 
second is highly significant (p-value: 0.0212). 
d.  Within-subject consistency 
One further expectation of the standard economic model is that individuals respond to 
repeated choice tasks with reference to a stable set of well-formed preferences. Under that 
assumption, we would expect respondents’ choices to exhibit internal consistency. For 
example, it would not be consistent for an individual in sample C1 to refuse to pay the low 
price for immediate full health in the first choice task (C11) but then agree to pay the medium 
price in the third choice task (C13) when in both tasks the alternative costless treatment results 
in the same mild ill-health event.  
Respondents to the survey, it transpires, are remarkably consistent. In all 151 cases 
where individuals made choices in the first task that reveal preferences dictating a particular 
choice in the second task, that consistent choice was made. Of the 138 cases where a choice 








inconsistent choice.  
So far, the prognosis for CE is rather positive. Respondents achieve a high level of 
internal consistency in their responses and across-sample tests suggest those responses 
conform to some basic tenets of economic theory. Importantly, a test of responses to the first 
choice task finds the distribution of preferences expressed by different samples to be 
statistically indistinguishable. Accordingly, we take those first task responses as unbiased 
reflections of population preferences and treat responses to the first choice tasks as control 
cases to which other responses can be compared. 
4.2 Price Sequence Effects 
The stylised facts from the contingent valuation literature suggest an asymmetric 
response to price sequences (see Table 1). If the CE elicitation format induces the same 
systematic shifts in expressed preferences then we would expect to see unusually low 
acceptance rates for an option in a worsening price sequence but no significant shifts for 
options in improving price sequences. As shown in Table 2, a comparison of the responses of 
samples A1 and A2 provide a test of that contention.  
a.  Test 7: Worsening price sequence 
The control case for our worsening price sequence test is provided by sample A2. Here 
we observe 67.5% of the sample choosing Option II in the first task (A21). Sample A1 face the 
exact same task but as their second choice (A12). This second task differs from the first (A11) 
only in so much as the price of Option II increases. This worsening price sequence has a 
substantial impact with only 57.8% of that sample selecting Option II, almost 10% less than 
in the control case. As shown in Test 7 of Table 4, a one-tailed test reveals this difference to 
be significant at the 90% level of confidence (p-value: 0.0996).  
[INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE] 
b.  Test 8: Improving price sequence 
The control case for our improving price sequence test is provided by samples A1, B2 








observe 74.5% of respondents choosing Option II. The exact same choice is presented to 
sample A2 as their second task (A22). This second task differs from the first (A21) only in that 
Option II is offered at a lower price. This improving price sequence has a negligible impact 
on expressed preferences with the proportion selecting Option II remaining relatively stable 
at 75.9%. Not surprisingly, Test 8 of Table 4 shows that these two proportions do not differ 
significantly (p-value from a two-tailed test: 0.7896).  
Our data provide evidence of price-sequencing effects in CE tasks. We observe a 
substantial (if only marginally significant) reduction in the frequency with which respondents 
choose an option if, all else equal, that option is in a worsening price sequence. In contrast, 
no systematic impact on preferences can be discerned for options in improving price 
sequences. The pattern we observe in our CE data exactly replicates the sequencing effects 
recorded by De Shazo (2002) in DBDC contingent valuation data.  
4.3. Commodity Sequence Effects 
The stylised facts from the contingent valuation literature (Table 1) point to the 
possibility that an option in a worsening (improving) commodity sequence will be regarded 
less (more) favourably by respondents. As shown in Table 2, the responses of samples B1 and 
B2 provide the basis for our tests of those possible commodity-sequencing effects.  
a.  Test 9: Worsening commodity sequence 
The control case for our test of worsening commodity sequences is provided by the 
first choice task presented to samples A1, B2 and C2. Some 25.5% of that combined sample 
chose the severe ill-health event offered by Option I. Sample B1 face the exact same task 
(B12) but second in the sequence where the previous task (B11) differed only in that Option I 
entailed enduring a mild ill-health event. This worsening commodity sequence has a major 
impact on the selection of Option I with only 8.4% of the sample making that choice. As 
shown in Test 9 of Table 4, a one-tailed test reveals this to be a highly significant difference 
(p-value: 0.0002).  








The control case for the improving commodity sequence is provided by the first task 
presented to sample B1. We observe 37.7% of that sample plumping for the mild ill-health 
event offered by Option I. Sample B2 faced the same task second in the sequence such that 
Option I is in an improving commodity sequence. Again this precipitates a considerable shift 
in expressed preferences with the proportion choosing Option I jumping to 64.7%.The formal 
test shown as Test 9 in Table 4 confirms this to be a highly significance difference (p-value 
from a one-tailed test: 0.0005).  
Accordingly, the pattern of responses observed in our data offers strong evidence of 
commodity-sequencing anomalies. Moreover, in contrast to the asymmetry observed in price-
sequencing, these anomalies function in both improving and worsening directions. Again, our 
data confirm that the patterns of commodity-sequencing anomalies observed in DC 
contingent valuation studies persist in CEs. 
4.4. Mixed Sequence Effects 
Of course, unlike DC contingent valuation, CEs typically vary more than just one 
attribute of one option from choice task to choice task. Such variation may lead to situations 
in which both options in a task are in sequences that might potentially influence respondents’ 
choices. We refer to such tasks as being in a mixed sequence. As described in Table 2, 
samples C1 and C2 provide the basis for our tests of the biases induced by mixed sequences.  
a.  Test 11: Improving mixed price and commodity sequence 
Consider first the comparison between responses to questions C11 and C22. Both 
present a choice between a costless treatment resulting in a mild ill-health event (Option I) 
and a low priced treatment that removes all symptoms (Option II). While C11 represents our 
control case, C22 is the second choice task such that Option I is in an improving commodity 
sequence (the previous task offering a severe ill-health event) and Option II is in an 
improving price sequence (the previous task offering a medium price). Given our earlier 
findings, our expectation is that respondents to task C22 will be much better disposed to 








sequence will have no impact on preferences for Option II. Accordingly we might expect 
rather more respondents to select Option I in C22 than in the control case (C11). As shown in 
Test 11 of Table 4, this is what we observe; 22.9% prefer Option I in C11 but this proportion 
increases to 41% in C22. A one-tailed test reveals this to be a significant difference (p-value: 
0.0063).  
b.  Test 12: Worsening mixed price and commodity sequence 
The worsening mixed price and commodity sequences are tested by comparing 
responses to C12 to the control case provided by A21. Here we have no directional hypothesis 
since in task C12 both options are in worsening sequences and hence both should be regarded 
less favourably. The data provides support for this contention as in both tasks the proportion 
favouring Option I is identically 32.5%. As shown in Test 12 of Table 4, there are no 
statistically significant differences in these observations. 
It appears that the price and commodity-sequencing effects we have documented in 
very simple sequences (where the attributes of just one option of the choice change) can be 
used to explain the patterns of response observed in these more complex mixed sequences 
(where the attributes of both options of the choice change).  In particular, the sequencing 
effect in a mixed sequence can be explained as the compounded impacts of the commodity 
and price-sequencing effects acting on the individual options of the choices.  
4.5. Third Task Sequence Effects 
Thus far our examination has focused on the nature of the sequence of first and 
second choice tasks. We shall refer to that sequence as the initial sequence. Moreover, since 
the response anomalies observed in the second task are determined by the nature of the 
immediately preceding task we shall dub those observed anomalies first-order sequencing 
effects. In Figure 7 the arrow indicating the first-order initial sequence is depicted as a solid 
line to reflect that this sequence precipitates observed response anomalies in the second 
choice task. 








particular, the third task forms a first-order sequence with the second task; a sequence that we 
shall refer to as the secondary first-order sequence. In addition, the third choice task forms a 
second-order sequence with the first choice task. In Figure 7, these sequences are depicted as 
dashed arrows to reflect the fact that we have yet to establish whether they precipitate 
response anomalies in the third choice task. 
[INSERT FIGURE 7 AROUND HERE]  
One possibility is that respondents react to both or either of these additional sequences 
using the same heuristics that drove the biases we have observed in the initial first-order 
sequence (replicated for reference in the second column of Table 5). Under that assumption, 
we can identify the particular type of sequence characterising the move from the second to 
third choice tasks and thereby predict the direction of bias the secondary first-order sequence 
might precipitate in responses to the third task. Those predictions are listed in column 3 of 
Table 5.
1  Likewise, comparing the first task with the third task allows us to predict the 
direction of bias that might be precipitated by the second-order sequence. Those predicted 
biases are listed in column 4 of Table 5.  
To illustrate, the initial first-order sequence for sample A1 is a worsening price 
sequence that we have observed to shift preferences in favour of Option I. That observed bias 
is indicated by a plus sign in column 2. The secondary first-order sequence for sample A1 is 
an improving mixed sequence. As an initial sequence that pattern was observed to bias 
                                                 
1 In making these predictions, recall that the sequencing effect precipitated by the worsening mixed sequence 
does not provide a unique directional prediction. Rather the overall effect depends on the relative strength of 
conflicting improving price and commodity sequence effects. The initial sequence of Sample C1 is a worsening 
mixed sequence. In this sequence it appears that the impact of the worsening price sequence in Option II, 
moving from Low to High, cancels out the impact of the worsening commodity sequence in Option I, moving 
from Mild to Severe. In that case, no response bias is seen in the second task. The secondary sequence of 
Sample B2 is a similar worsening mixed sequence. Option I is in the identical commodity sequence (mild to 
severe) but the worsening price sequence in Option II  is less extreme  (Med to High). In this case, it seems 
unlikely that the two sequencing effects will cancel. Accordingly, the entry in column 3 of Table 5 for sample B2 








preferences in favour of Option I (sample C2). Accordingly, we record that prediction in 
column 3 with a plus symbol. Finally, the second-order sequence for this sample forms an 
improving commodity sequence. As an initial sequence that pattern of tasks biases responses 
in favour of Option I (sample B2). As such, column 4 for sample A2 contains a plus symbol. 
Columns 5 to 8 of Table 5 provide a summary of the direction of biases actually 
observed in the third choice tasks. In each case, the response proportions of the third task 
have been compared to the appropriate control case and one- and two-tailed tests of 
differences in proportions performed in order to identify the statistical significance of any 
differences. For example, in the case of Sample A1 we observe responses to the third task 
biased in favour of Option I. Of course, that bias is what we might expect given that all three 
sequences for that sample are predicted to push preferences in that direction. Indeed, the bias 
is shown to be significant at the 90% level of confidence using a one-tailed test.  
Unfortunately, since for sample A1 all sequences work to bias responses in the same 
direction, that sample is relatively uninformative in untangling which of the sequences, if 
any, are responsible for the response bias observed in the third task. The possibility remains 
that responses to the third task are influenced by any combination of the various first- and 
second-order effects. In the following, we use our data to explore a number of hypotheses 
regarding the determinants of bias in third tasks.  
 [INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE] 
a.  Hypothesis 1: No Sequencing Effects in Responses to Third Choice Tasks 
We begin by establishing that response biases can be observed in the third choice 
tasks. After all, it might be the case that the sequencing effects seen in response to the second 
choice task result from respondents reacting adversely to the unexpected presentation of this 
subsequent question (‘a moment ago, you offered me that same commodity at a better 
price!’). It is possible, that by the time the third question is presented, respondents have come 
to terms with the repeated nature of the exercise, such that responses to the third task are not 








In this case, our alternative hypothesis is simply that there is some unspecified 
difference in responses between first and third choice tasks. As such, the appropriate test is 
two-tailed. Looking down the final column of Table 5, it is clear that in the cases of samples 
A2 and C2 we can reject the null of consistency of responses to first and third choice tasks 
with greater than 90% and 99% confidence respectively. Evidently third choice tasks are not 
immune from response anomalies. 
b.  Hypothesis 2: Residual Effect from Initial Sequence 
Maintaining the assumption that secondary first-order and second-order sequences do 
not generate response anomalies, an alternative hypothesis asserts that the initial sequence 
can cause a systematic shift in respondents’ preferences that persists in their consideration of 
the subsequent choice tasks. In this case, we would expect the observed response bias from 
the initial sequence (column 2 of Table 5) to have the same sign as the observed response 
bias in the third task (column 5 of Table 5). Since these present directional hypotheses a one-
tailed test is appropriate.  
Samples A1 and C2 provide responses that conform to this hypothesis. The initial 
sequence precipitates a positive bias in favour of Option I and we also observe significant 
bias in the same direction in the third task. The responses of the remaining samples, however, 
provide contradicting evidence. The preferences of samples A2 and C1 are apparently 
unaffected by the initial sequences yet we observe statistically significant biases in favour of 
Option I in responses to the third task. Likewise, samples B1 and B2 express preferences that 
are significantly affected by the initial sequence but responses to the third task appear 
unbiased. The hypothesis of responses being influenced solely by the initial sequence is 
firmly rejected by our data. 
c.  Hypothesis 3: Second-Order Effect 
Another possibility is that respondents anchor on the attribute levels in the first choice 
task. Subsequent tasks are compared with this initial task and it is this comparison which 








can be explained through such a comparison. For third choice tasks the relevant comparison 
is that provided by the second-order sequence. As such, the response anomalies we might 
expect to observe in the third choice task are given by the directional predictions listed in 
column 4 of Table 5.  
The data conform much more closely to the predictions of this behavioural theory. We 
find that for samples A1, A2, C1 and C2 the bias in the third choice task is in the direction of 
that predicted from the second-order sequences and in all cases a one-tailed test confirms 
these biases to be significant with 90% confidence or greater. Sample B1 also conforms with 
the prediction though, in this case, that prediction is for no response anomaly in the third task. 
A two-tailed test confirms that there is no significant bias in responses to the third task. In the 
case of sample B2, however, the second-order sequence would imply a bias in favour of 
Option I in third task responses. A one-tailed test rejects that hypothesis.  
Accordingly, the proposition that the direction of response anomalies in third choice 
tasks can be explained through second-order sequence effects alone fails to completely 
explain the response patterns observed in our data. 
d.  Hypothesis 4: Compounding First-order Effects 
A further possibility is that response anomalies are precipitated primarily by first-
order sequencing effects. Over a series of choice tasks, responses may be influenced by each 
first-order sequence encountered. The initial sequence may systematically shift respondents’ 
preferences and then from that baseline the secondary sequence may precipitate a further 
shift. According to this theory, the bias we would expect to observe in responses to third tasks 
should be in the direction suggested by a compounding of the two first-order sequence 
effects. 
With reference to Table 5, we find that for all samples the predictions made by this 
hypothesis entirely conform to the observed direction of bias in third task responses. In 
sample A1 the initial and secondary first-order sequences both bias responses in favour of 








in the same direction (p-value: 0.0587). In samples A2 and C1, the initial sequence does not 
bias responses but the secondary sequence leads to a favouring of Option I. In both cases a 
significant bias in the predicted direction is observed in the third task responses (p-values: 
0.0306 and 0.0587 respectively). In sample C2 the initial sequence biases responses in favour 
of Option I but the secondary sequence should have no effect. Again we observe a significant 
bias in the expected direction (p-value: 0.0003). Finally, in samples B1 and B2, the initial and 
secondary sequences imply biases that operate to move preferences first in one direction and 
then in the other. As a result, the observation of no significant biases in third task responses 
(p-values: 0.8547 and 0.3947 respectively) entirely conforms to this behavioural model.  
In addition to the direction of bias, the idea of compounding first-order effects has 
implications for the magnitude of observed sequencing anomalies. For example, the initial 
sequence faced by sample A2 has no systematic impact on preferences. As such, we might 
expect the secondary sequence to induce the same magnitude of response anomaly as would 
be observed if it were the initial sequence. Observe that the secondary sequence faced by 
sample A2 is identical to the initial sequence faced by sample C2. If our contention is correct 
then the response proportions for task A23 should closely resemble those for task C22. Again, 
the data supports the behavioural model; we observe 36.1% choosing Option I in task A23, an 
amount that does not differ significantly from the 41% choosing that option in task C22 (p-
value from a two-tailed test: 0.5326).  
A contradicting example is provided by a comparison of samples A1 and C1. Here we 
would expect the magnitude of the response bias in the third choice task to be larger in A13 
than in C13. The reason for that expectation is that both samples face an identical secondary 
sequence. The initial sequence of sample A1, however, acts to positively reinforce the bias of 
the secondary sequence whereas the initial sequence of sample C1 is observed not to bias 
responses. In actuality, we observe the response bias in the third task to be of identical 








The theory of compounding first-order sequencing effects successfully organises our 
data. The predictions of that behavioural model perfectly predict the direction of biases 
observed in responses to the third choice task. Having said that, we acknowledge that we do 
not have a perfect explanation for all of our data; in one case we observe that the magnitude 
of response biases does not conform to expectations. In addition, our data does not allow us 
to identify whether the compounding of first-order sequencing effects is further compounded 
by the second-order sequence. A new experimental design would be needed to cast greater 
light on these issues.  
 
5. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
Despite the recent and rapid uptake of CE methods by non-market valuation 
practitioners, there are reasons to suspect that the method may suffer from sequencing 
anomalies. Previous research in this area has, in the main, focussed on the possibility that 
responses to CEs are affected by position in the sequence of tasks. In contrast, our research 
explores the question of whether the particular sequence of choice tasks matters. Drawing on 
the insights provided by the literature on sequencing anomalies in iterative DC contingent 
valuation studies this paper reports on an experiment specifically designed to assess that 
question.  
Our findings categorically reject the assumption that CEs are immune from 
sequencing anomalies. Moreover, they confirm that the pattern of sequencing anomalies is 
determined by the particular sequence of choice tasks. What is more, those patterns closely 
replicate the patterns of sequencing anomaly observed in the DC contingent valuation 
responses. To be specific, our results indicate that the frequency with which respondents 
choose options in worsening price sequences is significantly reduced though the opposite 
anomaly is not observed for options in improving price sequences (a pattern observed in DC 
contingent valuation data by De Shazo, 2002). In addition, we find highly significant 








directions with significant reductions (increases) in choice probabilities observed for options 
in worsening (improving) commodity sequences. An open question raised by our research is 
why significant sequencing effects are observed in improving commodity sequences but not 
improving price sequences.  
The patterns of choice suggested by these sequencing behaviours completely organise 
our data, explaining the direction of bias observed to choice tasks in mixed sequences; that is, 
when one option of a choice task is presented in an improving (worsening) price sequence, 
while the other is presented in an improving (worsening) commodity sequence. In addition, 
we find robust evidence to suggest that these first-order sequencing anomalies are 
compounded over a series of choice tasks.  
The central message of our paper is that CEs are vulnerable to sequencing anomalies 
and that the particular pattern of anomaly can be explained by the particular sequence of 
choice tasks. Our findings cast serious doubt on the current practice of asking each 
respondent to undertake several choice tasks in a CE whilst treating each response as an 
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Table 1: Impact of sequence on acceptance rates as observed in dichotomous choice 
contingent valuation studies 
 
   Sequence 
   Worsening Improving 























Table 2: Possible patterns of sequencing and predictions of resultant response bias in 
second choice task 
Sample   Option  1st choice  2nd choice  Sequence  Prediction of bias in 
Second Choice Task 
I Severe  Severe  No  sequence 
A1 
II €Med €High Worsening 
Increase attractiveness 
of Option I 
          
I Severe  Severe  No  sequence 
A2 
II €High €Med  Improving 
No bias 
          
I Mild  Severe  Worsening 
B1 
II €Med €Med  No  sequence 
Reduce attractiveness 
of Option I 
          
I Severe Mild  Improving 
B2 
II €Med €Med  No  sequence 
Increase attractiveness 
of Option I 
          
I Mild  Severe  Worsening 
C1 
II €Low €High Worsening 
No prediction 
          
I Severe Mild  Improving 
C2 
II €Med €Low  Improving 
Increase attractiveness 









Table 3: Tests of across-sample consistency in responses to Choice Task 1 




Response proportions the same for identical choice tasks: 
Test 1:  A11  B21 None  +0.9312
b 
Test 2:  A11  C21 None  +0.6004
b 
Test 3:  B21  C21 None  +0.6593
b 
More is better:         
Test 4:  A11, B21 & C21  B11  + Option I  +0.0190
a 
Higher prices are worse: 
Test 5:  A11, B21 & C21  A21  − Option II  -0.1061
a 
Test 6:  C11  B11  − Option II  -0.0212
a 
Notes: 
a From one-tailed test of equality of proportions 









Table 4: Tests of Sequencing Anomalies 
Sequence  Test 







Price Sequence:         
Test 7: Worsening  A12  A21  − Option II  -0.0996
a 
Test 8: Improving  A22  A11, B21 & 
C21  None +0.7896
b 
Commodity Sequence:         
Test 9: Worsening  B12  B21  − Option I  -0.0002
a 
Test 10: Improving  B22  B11  + Option I  +0.0005
a 




C22  C11 
+ Option I 






C12  A21 
- Option I 




a From one-tailed test of equality of proportions   








Table 5: Direction of first- and second-order sequence effects on preferences for Option 
I and observed response bias in the third choice task 
Sequences Effects in Option I  Bias in Third Task Responses 
Compared to Control Case 




















A1  +  + +    +  0.0587 0.1173 
A2  None  + +    +  0.0306 0.0612 
B1  −  + None    None  0.4274 0.8547 
B2  +  −
b  +   None  0.1973 0.3947 
C1  None  + +    +  0.0587  0.1173 
C2  +  None +    +  0.0003 0.0006 
Notes: 
a An observed sequencing effect is classified as being positive (+) or negative (−) if a one-tailed test is 
significant at the 90% confidence level or greater. 










Figure 1: Examples of Price-sequencing in a Choice Experiment 
Option II in an Improving Price Sequence: 
Choice Task 1    Choice Task 2 
Option I  Option II   Option I  Option II 
Small Large    Small Large 
€0  €High   €0  €Low 
 
Option II in a Worsening Price Sequence: 
Choice Task 1    Choice Task 2 
Option I  Option II   Option I  Option II 
Small Large    Small Large 










Figure 2: Examples of Commodity-sequencing in a Choice Experiment 
Option I in an Improving Commodity Sequence: 
Choice Task 1    Choice Task 2 
Option I  Option II    Option I  Option II 
Small  Large   Medium  Large 
€0 €High   €0 €High 
 
Option I in a Worsening Commodity Sequence: 
Choice Task 1    Choice Task 2 
Option I  Option II    Option I  Option II 
Medium  Large  Small  Large 









Figure 3: Examples of Mixed Pricing and Commodity-sequencing in a Choice 
Experiment  
Improving Commodity (Option I) and Price (Option II) Sequences: 
Choice Task 1    Choice Task 2 
Option I  Option II   Option I  Option II 
Small  Large   Medium  Large 
€0  €High   €0  €Low 
 
Worsening Commodity (Option I) and Price (Option II) Sequences: 
Choice Task 1    Choice Task 2 
Option I  Option II   Option I  Option II 
Medium  Large  Small  Large 










Figure 4: Health state descriptions used in the study 
Severe Ill-Health: 22223 
•  I have some problems in walking about 
•  I have some problems with self care 
•  I have some problems in performing my usual activities (work, study, housework, 
family or leisure activies) 
•  I have moderate pain or discomfort 
•  I am very anxious or depressed 
 
Mild Ill-Health: 21212 
•  I have some problems in walking about 
•  I have no problems with self care 
•  I have some problems in performing my usual activities (work, study, housework, 
family or leisure activies) 
•  I have no pain or discomfort 













Figure 5: Schematics of typical choice task 
 
 
  Option I  Option II 
Duration of 
Treatment  12 mths  12mths 
Symptoms Severe  None 
Duration of 
Symptoms  2 mths  None 
Cost €0  €120 
 
 












Figure 6:  Experimental design and observed acceptance rates for options in each 
task 
Sample  Choice Task 1    Choice Task 2    Choice Task 3 
                    
  A11  A12    A13 
I  Severe  25.3  I  Severe  42.2  I Mild 49.4 
A1 
II €Med 74.7    II €High 57.8    II €Med 50.6 
                    
  A21  A22    A23 
I  Severe  32.5  I  Severe  24.1  I Mild 36.1 
A2 
II €High 67.5    II €Med 75.9    II €Low 63.9 
                    
  B11  B12    B13 
I Mild 37.3  I  Severe  8.4   I Mild 24.1 
B1 
II €Med 62.7    II €Med 91.6    II €Low 75.9 
                    
  B21  B22    B23 
I  Severe  25.9  I Mild 64.7  I  Severe  38.8 
B2 
II €Med 74.1    II €Med 35.3    II €High 61.2 
                    
  C11  C12    C13 
I Mild 22.9  I  Severe  32.5  I Mild 49.4 
C1 
II €Low 77.1    II €High 67.5    II €Med 50.6 
                    
  C21  C22    C23 
I  Severe  28.9  I Mild 41.0  I  Severe  59.0 
C2 
II €Med 71.1    II €Low 59.0    II €High 41.0 
 
Notes:  
Top box of each choice task represents Option I, bottom box Option II. 
Acceptance rates are printed in the box to the right of each Option 
Severe = 2 months 22223, Mild = 2 months 21212 









Figure 7: First- and second-order sequences in a three-task choice experiment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Choice Task 
1 
Choice Task 
2 
Choice Task 
3 
First-Order 
Sequences: 
Initial Secondary 
Second-Order 
Sequence: 